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INTRODUCTION
Louisiana is Sportsman’s Paradise—home to some of the most soughtafter hunting, fishing, and nature-viewing opportunities in the world.1
Seeking to net the best catch, sportsmen and commercial fishermen scour
Louisiana’s coast. Due to the current legal landscape and Louisiana’s
constantly morphing coastal environment, however, these fishermen often
find that lawfully using Louisiana’s coastal waters is impossible.
Unlike most other coastal states, the vast majority of Louisiana’s
coastal lands are private.2 These lands are swiftly submerging,3 as
Louisiana loses the equivalent of a football field of coastal land every
hour.4 Under the current practice in Louisiana, many of these large tracts
of coastal land remain in private hands after they submerge.5 As a result,
even to the trained eye, the line between public and private coastal
property is often indiscernible.

Copyright 2016, by JACQUES MESTAYER.
1. Craig Gautreaux, Keeping Louisiana a Sportsman’s Paradise, LSUAG
CENTER.COM, http://www.lsuagcenter.com/en/communications/publications/agmag
/Archive/2012/Spring/Keeping-Louisiana-a-Sportsmans-Paradise.htm [perma.cc/KX
D4-ENY2] (last updated June 24, 2012, 6:32 PM) (noting Louisiana has long been
known as “Sportsman’s Paradise” and highlighting the many sporting opportunities
available in Louisiana).
2. See Brett Anderson, Louisiana Loses Its Boot, MATTER (Sept. 8, 2014),
https://medium.com/matter/louisiana-loses-its-boot-b55b3bd52d1e [perma.cc/H6C9FCM5] (noting that 80% of Louisiana’s coastal environment is private).
3. See ROBERT R. TWILLEY, COASTAL WETLANDS & GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE: GULF COAST WETLANDS SUSTAINABILITY IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 5
(2007), available at http://nctc.fws.gov/courses/csp/csp3112/resources/Climate
_Change/GulfCoastImpacts.pdf [perma.cc/GDW6-D2H7].
4. See Mark Schleifstein, Louisiana is Losing a Football Field of Wetlands
Every Hour, New U.S. Geological Survey Study Says, NOLA.COM (June 2, 2011,
9:37 PM), http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2011/06/louisiana_is_losing
_a_football.html [perma.cc/S8XT-ZADB].
5. Telephone Interview with Ryan Seidemann, Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Civil Div., La. Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 23, 2014). This Comment questions the
legitimacy of this result.
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In 2006, the Louisiana Legislature realized that permitting private
ownership of some submerged lands made the public’s utilization of state
lands and water bottoms difficult.6 As a result, the legislature commissioned
the State Lands Office to use an interactive mapping system to determine
the ownership of Louisiana’s lands and water bottoms.7 As the State Lands
Office began reviewing Louisiana’s coast, it found that large areas of
submerged land were formerly private land.8 Believing that, under article
450 of the Louisiana Civil Code,9 ownership of these lands reverted to the
State once the land became submerged, Louisiana informally claimed title
to the lands through the State Lands Office review.10 Prominent private
landowners strongly opposed these title claims and began lobbying the State
Lands Office not to take formal action.11 Apparently overlooking that article
450 may dictate that many submerged lands belong to the State,12 the State
Lands Office officials decided that a further assertion of State ownership
would lead to an onslaught of litigation that the State could not afford.13 In
the absence of a legislative solution to the problem, and in an effort to
minimize litigation, the State Lands Office opted to classify most of the
submerged land as “claimed by the state and the adjoining property owner”
and cautioned citizens to enter at their own risk.14 Instead of clearing up
titles, this classification clouded title to vast areas of submerged land.
Although any state’s failure to declare that it owns certain areas of
submerged land would be problematic, that failure is especially problematic
for Louisiana because Louisiana’s coastal environment is submerging faster
than any other landmass in the United States.15

6. Id. Because there is a history of trespassing within Louisiana’s coastal
marshlands and waterbottoms, the Louisiana Legislature presumably knew of this
difficulty well before 2006. For an example of such a trespassing case, see La.
Navigation Co. v. Oyster Comm’n of La., 51 So. 706 (La. 1910).
7. See S. Res. 115, 105th Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2006).
8. Telephone Interview with Ryan Seidemann, supra note 5.
9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2015) (“Public things that belong to the state are
such as running waters, the waters and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies,
the territorial sea, and the seashore.”).
10. Telephone Interview with Ryan Seidemann, supra note 5.
11. Id.
12. See infra Part III.
13. Telephone Interview with Ryan Seidemann, supra note 5.
14. Id. This land category and disclaimer can be viewed in the legend on the
Louisiana Office of State Lands’ website. Disclaimer for SONRIS Interactive
Maps, SONRIS, http://sonris-www.dnr.state.la.us/gis/agsweb/IE/JSViewer/index
.html?TemplateID=381 [perma.cc/NV8M-U6RB] (last visited Oct. 21, 2015).
15. See TWILLEY, supra note 3, at 5.
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Between 1932 and 2000, Louisiana lost over one million acres of
coastal land to the Gulf of Mexico’s inescapable grasp.16 Due to a variety
of natural processes,17 over a million more acres of land will likely
submerge within the next 50 years.18 By then, Louisiana’s total land loss
will be roughly equivalent to two times the entire landmass of Delaware.19
Though some mitigating measures are in place,20 severe land loss will
continue unless the state or federal government subsidizes drastic
corrective action.21
As time passes, a combination of natural and manmade forces will
submerge larger quantities of Louisiana’s coast, thereby creating an
underwater labyrinth riddled with tracts of private land.22 Thus, promptly
declaring the ownership of submerged lands is imperative to give Louisiana’s
citizens some valuable direction regarding what lands are public. The
legislature should take note of the current and future issues regarding
submerged lands and formally declare ownership over them. Until then,
Louisiana’s citizens remain deprived of not only valuable property rights,
but also significant revenue from mineral transactions that accompany
State-owned submerged lands.
Part I of this Comment introduces the growing controversy involving
submerged coastal lands in Louisiana and illustrates the unique
16. See Anderson, supra note 2. For a noteworthy geomorphology study
describing extensive land change as a simple and expected result of delta lobe
switching, see David E. Frazier, Recent Deltaic Deposits of the Mississippi River:
Their Development and Chronology, 17 GULF COAST ASS’N GEOLOGICAL
SOC’IES TRANSACTIONS 287 (1967). For an in-depth presentation exploring land
loss, land change, and the natural factors responsible for most of the coastal
change in Louisiana, see Chris McLindon, PowerPoint Presentation, Rethinking
Coastal Restoration: The Delta Cycle and Land Area Change in the Louisiana
Coastal Plain, http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/climate/docs/The_Delta_Cycle_and_Land
_Area_Change_in_Coastal_Louisiana.pptx (last visited Oct. 24, 2015).
17. See TWILLEY, supra note 3, at 4–5. Louisiana’s total land loss is
undoubtedly due to a combination of natural and man-caused forces. Id. However,
due to the different and numerous concerns present when human action causes
land loss, this Comment seeks only to address land issues caused by natural forces.
18. See Anderson, supra note 2.
19. Id.
20. See 2 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS
ON WETLANDS 67 (1994); LA. COASTAL PROT. & RESTORATION AUTH.,
LOUISIANA’S COMPREHENSIVE MASTER PLAN FOR A SUSTAINABLE COAST 29 (2012),
available at http://issuu.com/coastalmasterplan/docs/coastal_master_plan-v2?e=372
2998/2447530 [perma.cc/C2NE-4FNQ].
21. See id. at 19.
22. See Anderson, supra note 2.
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significance that these lands offer to the people of Louisiana. Part II
focuses on the origin and historical treatment of submerged lands in
Louisiana, specifically concentrating on the scope of Louisiana Civil Code
article 450 and the jurisprudence dealing with its categories, namely
“natural navigable water bottoms,” “arms of the sea,” and “seashore.” Part
III recognizes that the State owns submerged lands that became natural
navigable water bottoms, sea bottoms, and seashore prior to alienation by
the State.23 Further, Part III argues that no sound reason exists to
distinguish natural navigable water bottoms, sea bottoms, and seashore
that existed before state alienation and those that came into existence
following state alienation. Finally, Part IV contemplates potential remedies
to this arbitrary distinction regarding submerged lands and then proposes
a legislative amendment that will clearly assert the State’s ownership over
those submerged lands, thereby ensuring that private landowners shall no
longer reap fruits lawfully belonging to the State of Louisiana.
I. THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF LOUISIANA’S SUBMERGED COASTAL
MARSHLANDS SHOULD PROMPT THE STATE TO FORMALLY
DECLARE OWNERSHIP OVER THEM
A growing “emphasis on coastal resource management and increasing
conflicts of interest between private owners and the state have led to . . .
‘a tidal wave’ of boundary disputes” throughout the coastal United
States.24 Louisiana is no stranger to this phenomenon. In fact, the battle
between public interests and private property rights is particularly fierce
in Louisiana.25
Fearful of surrendering any of their land due to the significant
economic and property losses that would occur, private landowners
strongly oppose a declaration that the ownership of formerly dry ground
reverts to the State upon submersion.26 These landowners believe that
23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 31 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “alienation” as a
“[c]onveyance or transfer of property to another”).
24. See Sue Nichols, Tidal Boundary Delimitation: Some North American
Perspectives, N.Z. SURVEYOR, Feb. 1987, at 560, 570, available at http://coast
.noaa.gov/mbwg/_pdf/biblio/Nichols.pdf [perma.cc/N9YY-CYF4].
25. See Katy Reckdahl, Mixing Oil and Water: An Inside Look at What
Happens When Land Sinks and Oil Money is on the Line, WEATHER CHANNEL,
http://stories.weather.com/mixingoilandwater [perma.cc/P86M-M237] (last visited
Oct. 16, 2015).
26. Id. For this land to become State-owned, it must submerge to such an
extent that it could properly be classified as either a natural navigable water
bottom, sea bottom, or seashore. See infra Part II.A.
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forcing them to relinquish land to the State merely because Mother Nature
irrepressibly overtakes their land is unfair.27 This usurpation of land
appears even more unjust considering that billions of dollars in minerals
lie beneath these lands. Although a change in ownership of the submerged
land would not affect existing mineral rights that already burden the
submerged land28—such as mineral leases, royalty agreements, or
servitude agreements—private landowners would still lose all future
mineral rights to that land.29
In stark contrast to the interests of private landowners, Louisiana’s
sportsmen and commercial fishermen favor a declaration that the State
owns certain submerged lands. The more submerged lands the State owns,
the more area these individuals can utilize for their business and pleasure.30
According to a survey conducted by the American Sportfishing Association,
in 2001, non-resident anglers spent approximately five million hours fishing
in Louisiana.31 That year, the sportfishing industry reeled in approximately
$959 million in retail sales, $453 million in salaries and wages, and $93
million in state and local tax revenues.32 One cannot overstate this industry’s
value to the people of Louisiana; however, Louisiana’s coastal environment
is even more highly valued for commercial fishing purposes. Louisiana’s
commercial fishing industry regularly nets nearly $2 billion in sales.33
Such a significant contribution to the economy is unsurprising because this

27. Reckdahl, supra note 25.
28. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1151 (2006) (dictating that when the title to
land transfers to another through a variety of ways, including naturally caused
land loss, the transferee of title receives the land without affecting some
encumbrances of mineral rights).
29. Id. Importantly, however, a declaration that the State owns certain
submerged coastal lands would not have a significant net effect on oil and gas
exploration and extraction. Rather, a declaration would merely change the
primary beneficiaries of those efforts. The State, instead of private landowners,
would have the right to lease the submerged land and to receive mineral royalties
and bonuses.
30. See, e.g., Todd Masson, Popular South Louisiana Fishing Area Now OffLimits to Anglers, NOLA.COM (Aug. 1, 2014, 9:18 AM), http://www.nola.com/out
doors/index.ssf/2014/08/popular_fishing_area_now_off-l.html [perma.cc/UX8V3TA3].
31. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NOAA, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
FISHERIES ECONOMICS OF THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 130 (2014), available at
http://media.nola.com/environment/other/Fisheries%20Economics%20of%20the
%20U.S.%202012.pdf [perma.cc/A8CT-BWUP].
32. Id.
33. Id.
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industry hauls in nearly 25% of all the seafood in the United States.34
Opening up more of Louisiana’s coastal environment to sportsmen and
commercial fishermen would cause an appreciable increase in profits for
all of these industries.
Although both sides have significant interests and compelling reasons
for their position on the issue, private landowners’ interests have prevailed
up until this point. Oil and gas companies, the most prominent private
landowners of Louisiana’s marshlands, employ nearly 300,000 people in
Louisiana.35 Louisiana’s oil and gas industry generates over $20 billion in
household earnings annually.36 Because of its pervasive economic impact,
that industry has influence. Nevertheless, Louisiana’s policies and laws
should not neglect the interests of Louisiana’s sportsmen and commercial
fishermen.37 Leaving so many coastal boundaries unsettled not only
deprives those individuals of substantial revenue, it also exposes them to
criminal trespass liability.38 Declaring that the State owns certain
submerged lands would allow sportsmen and commercial fishermen to
access more land while having little net effect on oil and gas exploration
and extraction in Louisiana.39
34. A Look at Louisiana Agriculture, AGCLASSROOM.ORG, https://www.agclass
room.org/teacher/stats/louisiana.pdf [perma.cc/G8GR-H83B] (last visited Oct. 30,
2015).
35. See Newest Economic Impact Study Reinforces Oil and Gas Industry’s
Importance to Louisiana, GROW LA. COAL. (July 10, 2014), http://www.grow
louisianacoalition.com/newest-economic-impact-study-reinforces-oil-gas-industrysimportance-louisiana/ [perma.cc/MN6F-A6SC].
36. Id.
37. See LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The natural resources of the state, including
air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the
environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible
and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature
shall enact laws to implement this policy.”).
38. For decades, law enforcement agencies have fined and arrested anglers,
crawfish fishermen, hunters, and other types of sportsmen for trespassing on
submerged land. See, e.g., Brown v. Rougon, 552 So. 2d 1052 (La. Ct. App.
1989); State v. Barras, 602 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Buckskin Hunting
Club v. Bayard, 868 So. 2d 266 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
39. See supra note 29. In the event that submerged lands become stateowned, pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:1151, existing mineral
rights remain unaffected. However, any new mineral rights, meaning those that
did not burden the land at the time ownership reverted but that subsequently
burden the land after ownership changes, will become vested in the State.
Although this would effectively remove these mineral interests from the hands of
private landowners, little net effect on oil and gas exploration and extraction
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II. THE HISTORY, DOCTRINE, AND JURISPRUDENCE PERTAINING TO
SUBMERGED LAND OWNERSHIP IN LOUISIANA
Due to the vast economic and sentimental value of Louisiana’s
submerged coastal marshlands, declaring that the State owns certain
submerged coastal lands is vitally important to the people of Louisiana.
Examining the history of Louisiana’s coastal environment elucidates how
such a significant mass of submerged land found its way into private hands
in the first place.
A. Tracing the Origin of Louisiana’s Privately Owned Coastal
Marshlands
Currently, most of Louisiana’s coastal marshlands are private.40 This
private ownership is an anomaly, as most states have a broad reach with
respect to coastal land ownership.41 This abnormality in Louisiana is
largely attributable to the Swamp Land Grant Acts of 1849 and 1850,42
which gave Louisiana an estimated nine million acres of “swamp and
overflowed lands” that were unfit for cultivation.43 The collective purpose
of these grants was to permit Louisiana to sell these lands and use the
proceeds to protect valuable agricultural lands near the banks of the
Mississippi River.44 In furtherance of this objective, Louisiana began
passing legislation permitting the alienation of a vast amount of coastal
swamplands.45 In particular, the legislature passed Act 75 of 1880 that
seemingly extended the alienability of Louisiana’s lands beyond the
original scope of the Swamp Land Grants. Although those federal grants
gave Louisiana “swamp and overflowed lands,” Act 75 allowed the

would occur, because oil and gas companies would still likely want to lease lands
from the State to explore for minerals due to the profits that these companies
would be able to realize via production.
40. See Anderson, supra note 2.
41. For example, Mississippi claims state ownership over all lands naturally
subject to tidal influence up to the present-day mean high water mark. See Cinque
Bambini P’ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 520 (Miss. 1986) (“Only those lands,
not tidelands in 1817, which have become such via the natural process of accretion
or the general rising or inland expansion of the tide have in law been added to the
trust so that title is held by the State.”).
42. Cf. Patrick G. Tracy, Jr., Public Use Issues, 54TH MIN. L. INST., Apr. 12–
13, 2007, at II-5 n.14.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Act No. 247, 1855 La. Acts 306; Act No. 306, 1855 La. Acts 372.
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alienation of “sea marsh or prairie, subject to tidal overflow.”46 As noted
by Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos:
This Act was destined to create confusion [because] it seemed to
obliterate the difference between lands “subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide[,]” [otherwise known as lands subject to tidal
overflow] that Louisiana acquired from the United States under
the equal footing doctrine, and “swamp lands subject to overflow”
that Louisiana acquired from the United States under the Swamp
Land Grant Acts.47
Indeed, after the passage of Act 75, courts began jumbling land descriptions
by classifying “sea marsh and sea prairie subject to tidal overflow”
separately from “lands within the tidewaters of the sea.”48 Thus, all sea
marsh and sea prairie subject to tidal overflow became alienable,49 thereby
permitting private ownership of vast areas of land highly susceptible to
submersion. As a result, 80% of Louisiana’s coastal marshlands are now
private.50
Most of these private coastal marshlands either are submerged or will
become submerged in the near future.51 Avoiding those lands when
46. See Act No. 75, § 11, 1880 La. Acts 87 (“That the public lands donated
by Congress to the State of Louisiana, designated as sea marsh or prairie, subject
to tidal overflow, so as to render them unfit for settlement and cultivation, shall
be subject to entry and sale . . . .” (emphasis added)).
47. See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 66, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 125 (4th ed. 2001); cf. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 218
(1845) (distinguishing between waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and
swamplands, and noting that tidelands “between the low and high” tide that are
covered by the ebb and flow of the tide belong to the State).
48. This arbitrary distinction is significant, because lands that were “sea
marsh and sea prairie subject to tidal overflow” were alienable, while “lands
within the tidewaters of the sea” were inalienable. See State v. Sweet Lake Land
& Oil Co., 113 So. 833, 836 (La. 1927). For a thorough discussion of the practical
difficulties present when making tidal boundary determinations, see Nichols,
supra note 24.
49. Cf. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co., 113 So. at 836 (“The Legislature, in
providing for the sale of the vast areas of land, described ‘as sea marsh, subject to
tidal overflow,’ acknowledged that such lands were included in the donations by
the Congress of the United States, by the swamp land grants of 1849 and 1850, in
which grants the lands donated were described as ‘the swamp and overflowed
lands.’”).
50. See Anderson, supra note 2; Judith Perhay, Louisiana Coastal Restoration:
Challenges and Controversies, 27 S.U. L. REV. 149, 153 (2000).
51. See text accompanying supra notes 16–18.
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navigating, fishing, or hunting near Louisiana’s coast is a formidable
task,52 which has become even more difficult since the passage of House
Bill 667 in 2003. That bill removed the requirement that landowners place
signs indicating that their land is private.53 Declaring that the State owns
all submerged lands within the scope of Louisiana Civil Code article 450
would allow Louisiana’s sportsmen to utilize many coastal areas without
subjecting themselves to liability for trespassing. Further, this declaration
would align with the explicit language in article 450.
B. Article 450 and its Effect on the Origin of Submerged Coastal Land
Ownership in Louisiana
Several different types of submerged land exist in Louisiana,
including bottoms of navigable waterways, seashores, the banks of
streams and rivers, and beds and bottoms of bays and lagoons. The
Louisiana Civil Code treats these submerged land categories differently
depending on their physical qualities.
According to the Code, submerged lands may be common, public, or
private things.54 Article 450 of the 1870 Louisiana Civil Code stated that
common things “are those the ownership of which belongs to nobody in
particular, and which all men may freely use . . . such as air, running water,
the sea, and its shores.”55 That principle, however, underwent significant
revision in 1979. The current version of that article, Louisiana Civil Code
article 449, illustrates that common things are things “such as air and the
high seas that may be freely used by everyone,” and that the “common”
category no longer includes running water, the seashore, and the waters
and beds of the sea within Louisiana’s boundaries.56 Because this
Comment is only concerned with submerged lands, and comment (c) to
Article 449 notes that legislation removed several types of submerged land
from the category of common things, that category is inapplicable. Thus,
submerged lands may be public things, or they may fall under the residual
category of private things.57

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See supra note 38.
See H.B. 667, 102d Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2003).
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 448 (2015).
LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (1870).
LA. CIV. CODE art. 449 (2015); see also id. cmt. c.
See id. art. 453 cmt. a.
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If submerged lands are public, they likely fall within the scope of
article 450.58 Article 450 provides that “running waters, the waters and
bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the territorial sea, and the
seashore” are public things that are insusceptible of private ownership.59
Sea bottoms, seashore, and navigable water bottoms are each a type of
submerged land because water covers each. In addition, each category
includes land commonly found near Louisiana’s coast. Thus, article 450
possibly covers submerged land that private individuals owned when the
land was above water.60 If this submerged land fits under one of the three
land categories covered by article 450, then the land is state-owned and
insusceptible of private ownership.
1. The Traditional Definition of “Natural Navigable Water Bodies”
Although article 450 dictates that the bottoms of natural navigable
water bodies, sea bottoms, and seashore are public things, the Louisiana
Civil Code fails to define these submerged land categories.61 Nevertheless,
Louisiana doctrine and jurisprudence offer some guidance.62 Since the
mid-1800s, Louisiana courts have utilized a variety of factors to define a
“natural navigable water body,” but they have not applied the factors
consistently.63 Despite the lack of clarity within each prong, separately
analyzing “natural” and “navigable” is the proper approach to define the
term “natural navigable water bodies.” If a body of water is both “natural”
and “navigable,” then, in theory, that water body and its bottoms should
belong to the State rather than the private parties currently claiming
ownership.64

58. Cf. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 63, at 116 (noting that a literal
interpretation of article 450 could lead to a conclusion that the bottoms of newly
navigable water bodies are public things).
59. See LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3; LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 cmt. c (“The first
category consists of things which according to constitutional and legislative
provisions are inalienable and necessarily owned by the state or its political
subdivisions.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1101 (2008).
60. See supra note 58.
61. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 cmt. f.
62. Id.
63. See infra Part II.B.1.b.
64. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450.
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a. Defining “Natural”
Louisiana courts have consistently dealt with cases addressing the
meaning of “natural” in article 450. In Miami Corp. v. State, the Louisiana
Supreme Court decided the ownership of a portion of private land that
eroded into the bed of a navigable water body.65 The court implied that
erosion and subsidence66 are natural forces by finding that “where the[se]
forces . . . have operated on the banks of a navigable body of water . . . the
submerged area becomes a portion of the bed and is insusceptible of
private ownership.”67 In Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., the United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals directly discussed the meaning of
“natural.”68 Interpreting Louisiana law, the court was “persuaded that
waterways made navigable through erosion are ‘naturally’ navigable even
though the erosion is caused by increased water flow from a connecting
dredged canal.”69 If manmade canals cause “natural” erosion, then, a
fortiori, subsidence of coastal lands, sea-level rise, and erosion caused by
wind and water are also “natural” forces. Thus, these natural forces must
fall under the scope of “natural” in article 450.
b. Defining “Navigable”
For nearly two centuries, courts have dealt with cases addressing the
meaning of “navigable.”70 Historically, a water body was navigable in law
if the water body was navigable in fact in 1812, the year Louisiana entered
the Union.71 In recent years, courts have expanded this interpretation. In
Vermilion Bay Land Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal found that water bodies are navigable in law if
they became navigable in fact before the State alienated them to private
65. 173 So. 315 (La. 1936).
66. Subsidence is defined as “the sinking or settling of land to a lower level
in response to various natural and man-caused factors.” Definition of Land
Subsidence, ECOLOGYDICTIONARY.ORG, www.ecologydictionary.org/land_subsidence
(last visited Jan. 20, 2015).
67. See Miami Corp., 173 So. at 322.
68. See 985 F.2d 824, 833 (5th Cir. 1993).
69. Id. (citing O’Brien v. State Mineral Bd., 24 So. 2d 470, 473 (La. 1945)).
70. For an early case discussing the meaning of “navigable,” see The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. (9 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
71. See, e.g., Ramsey River Rd. Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Reeves, 387 So. 2d
1194, 1196 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (“[T]herefore, if the waterway in question was
used for the purposes of trade and commerce in 1812, it is to be considered to
have been a navigable body of water although it may no longer serve that
purpose.”).
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parties, regardless of whether they were navigable in fact in 1812.72 The
court held that “[t]here is no sound reason to distinguish between the
inalienable character of navigable waterbeds which existed in 1812 . . .
and natural navigable waterbeds which, though non-navigable at the time
such bottoms were acquired by the State . . . [became] naturally navigable
prior to segregation by the State.”73 This holding echoed Louisiana’s
public policy of uninterrupted navigation and transportation, which favors
State ownership of navigable water bottoms.74 Though courts have not
ruled on this particular question since Vermilion Bay, prominent Louisiana
scholars concur with the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit.75 Still,
disagreement amongst courts persists regarding what makes a water body
navigable in fact.76
In general, a water body is navigable in fact if it is susceptible of being
used, in its ordinary condition, as a highway of commerce “over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade
and travel on water.”77 Yet Louisiana courts, reciting similar definitions,
have reached different conclusions regarding what physical characteristics
must be present for a water body to be navigable in fact. In Burns v.
Crescent Gun & Rod Club, the plaintiff sought a declaration that he had
the right to recreationally fish in four water bodies near Lake
Pontchartrain.78 Notably, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that no
commercial activities ever took place in these bodies of water and that the
water bodies in question were “grass choked” year round and only
susceptible to navigation by pirogues and small skiffs.79 Finding that
navigable in fact “means when a stream is large enough to float a boat of
some size, engaged in carrying trade,” the court held that this waterway
was not navigable.80 In Ramsey River Road Property Owners Ass’n v.
72. 646 So. 2d 408, 411 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
73. Id. at 411.
74. Id.
75. See Lee Hargrave, “Statutory” and “Hortatory” Provisions of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 43 LA. L. REV. 647, 660 (1983) (“If a
nonnavigable stream becomes navigable, it would cease to be susceptible of
private ownership and would become property of the State.”).
76. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 64, at 118 (noting that not all courts
follow the same test). Given the enactment of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,
33 U.S.C. § 1 (2012), one can make a strong argument that the United States has
wholly occupied the field on navigation.
77. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (9 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870); see also
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 64, at 118.
78. 41 So. 249, 251 (La. 1906).
79. See id.
80. Id.
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Reeves, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted a slightly broader
interpretation of navigable in fact.81 The court specifically held that the
Bogue Falaya River was navigable in fact because it was deep enough to
float logs down the river as part of a lumbering operation.82 In adopting
this interpretation, the court cited The Montello, a United States Supreme
Court case that decided a Wisconsin river was navigable despite its rapids
and falls that “embarrassed the navigation of early days.”83 Noting that not
every mode of commerce could successfully traverse the river, the
Montello Court pronounced that “[t]he capability of use by the public for
purposes of transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the
navigability of a river, rather than the extent and manner of that use.”84
Though most Louisiana courts readily agree that potential commercial
use is necessary to find navigability,85 in Kieff v. Louisiana Land and
Exploration Co., the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal suggested
that the use of a water body by commercial fisherman or crabbers does not
necessarily make a water body navigable in fact.86 In light of the
abundance of jurisprudence suggesting that commercial use is inherently
intertwined with a finding of navigability, the Fourth Circuit’s holding in
Kieff seems untenable. Indeed, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana implied that mere commercial fishing
activities can lead to a finding of navigability, even if those activities only
81. See 396 So. 2d 873, 876–77 (La. 1981) (“[I]n 1812 there was no
substantial difference in the nature of the river at the respective locations. For
instance, there was trial testimony that in the nineteenth century lumbering
operations were carried on in the vicinity of defendant’s proposed bridge and that
the lumber was floated down the Bogue Falaya to Covington. . . . We conclude
that the district court and the Court of Appeal were correct in determining that the
Bogue Falaya River at the point where defendants propose to build a bridge was
navigable in fact . . . .”).
82. Id.
83. See 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 432 (1874).
84. Id. at 441.
85. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bd. Comm’rs of Atchafalaya Basin Levee Dist. v.
Capdeville, 83 So. 421, 425 (La. 1919) (simply stated, a water course is navigable
when “by its depth, width, and location [it] is rendered available for commerce”);
Ramsey River Rd. Prop. Owners Ass’n, 396 So. 2d at 876 (“[T]hey are navigable
in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.”); State v. Aucoin,
20 So. 2d 136, 159–61 (La. 1944) (noting that a water body must be available for
commercial purposes to be navigable in fact).
86. See 779 So. 2d 85, 92 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (suggesting that use by
commercial oystermen and crabbers does not constitute navigability).
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occur seasonally.87 The district court’s holding seems more reasonable
than that of the fourth circuit. Some of the most common forms of
commerce or trade in coastal Louisiana are commercial fishing, oyster
farming, crabbing, and shrimping.88 When an oysterman hauls in 400
pounds of oysters and then transports them from his fishing area to the
dock, one may reasonably conclude that he is engaging in commerce.
Whether these kinds of commercial activities satisfy the definition of
navigable in fact, however, is still an open question.
Interpreting the existing jurisprudence, a water body existing in 1812
or created by natural forces—such as erosion, subsidence, and sea level
rise prior to State alienation89—that readily allows travel for commercial
purposes is a natural navigable water body within the purview of article
450. No law or jurisprudence, however, addresses whether a water body
that submerges after State alienation is properly classified as a natural
navigable water body.90
2. The Traditional Definition of the Territorial Sea and its
Extensions
Similar to natural navigable water bottoms, land categorized as sea
bottom belongs to the State under article 450.91 Ever since the legislature’s
passage of Louisiana Revised Statutes title 49, section 3, “territorial sea”
has referred to, at the very least, the seawater and sea bottoms between
Louisiana’s coastline and its territorial boundary, which extends three
miles from the coastline.92 The territorial sea likely reaches further inland,
however. First discussed in Pollard v. Hagan, the equal footing doctrine
87. Cf. Boudreaux v. La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, No. 6:11-CV-0834,
2014 WL 4219446 (W.D. La. Aug. 22, 2014) (refusing to grant summary
judgment because Boudreaux offered evidence that he fished commercially in the
disputed area).
88. See Plenty to Celebrate, LA. SEAFOOD, http://www.louisianaseafood.com
/industry [perma.cc/EVR3-TMT6] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (noting that these
industries have a vast effect on Louisiana’s economy).
89. This list of natural forces is illustrative.
90. See infra Part III.B.
91. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2015). Although article 450 only explicitly
includes “running waters, the waters and bottoms of natural navigable water
bodies, the territorial sea, and the seashore,” the bottom of the territorial sea is
implicitly included. See Milne v. Girodeau, 12 La. 324 (1838) (declaring that the
bed of Lake Pontchartrain is insusceptible of private ownership and thus, by
implication, classifying the Lake as “sea”).
92. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:3 (2012); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47,
§ 69, at 131.

904

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

granted all of the land under navigable waters, including land under
seawaters, to the new states upon their admission into the Union.93 Though
this doctrine only granted Louisiana ownership of sea bottoms up to the
average high water mark in 1812,94 Louisiana Civil Code article 451
establishes that Louisiana owns the sea bottom up to the highest normal
level of the seawater during winter, without regard for any boundary set in
1812.95 The Louisiana Supreme Court in Miami Corp. v. State followed
the spirit of the Civil Code by implicitly concluding that the “highest
ordinary level of the seawater during the winter season”96 is a dynamic
boundary that shifts due to natural forces.97 Responding to the notion that
the territorial sea extends further inland than the coastline, Louisiana
courts created a distinct category of public water bodies—“arms of the
sea”—that is governed by Article 450.98
In Davis Oil Co. v. Citrus Land Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court
settled years of confusion regarding the definition of arms of the sea.99
This case concerned a disagreement between the State and a private
93. See James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal
Footing and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1997).
94. See Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 985 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1993),
remand to No. 85–1015, 1994 WL 374309 (E.D. La. July 7, 1994), aff’d, 55 F.3d
1082 (5th Cir. 1995); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 69, at 131; cf. Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
95. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 451; see also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 69,
at 131–32.
96. Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 2d 315, 322–23 (La. 1936).
97. LA. CIV. CODE art. 451; see Miami Corp., 173 So. 2d at 322–23.
98. See, e.g., Zeller v. S. Yacht Club, 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882); Morgan v.
Negodich, 3 So. 636, 639 (La. 1887); Buras v. Salinovich, 97 So. 748, 750 (La.
1923); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 cmt. c.
99. See 576 So. 2d 495, 501 (La. 1991). For many years, Louisiana courts did
not provide a clear definition of “arm of the sea.” In D’albora v. Garcia, the
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal adopted an expansive interpretation of
an “arm of the sea,” finding that when a body of water connected to an arm of the
sea, and the tide ebbed and flowed regularly in that water body, that water body
was also an arm of the sea. 144 So. 2d 911, 914 (La. Ct. App. 1962). In Morgan
v. Negodich, the Louisiana Supreme Court, paying special attention to the route
Gulf waters took to enter a bayou, adopted a more restrictive interpretation of
“arm of the sea.” 3 So. 636, 639 (La. 1887) (finding that a water body forming a
connecting link between an arm of the sea and another bay was not an arm of the
sea). The Court in Morgan noted if the salt water in a water body adjacent to, or
connected with, an arm of the sea does not result from the high tide flooding its
banks, then that water body cannot be considered an arm of the sea. Id. at 639.
Subsequent cases briefly discussed arms of the sea, but to what that term referred
was unclear until Davis.
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landowner over the ownership of a tract of land consisting of alluvion100
located near the intersection between Shell Island Pass, a river, and Little
Bay.101 A dispute over which waterway the alluvion bordered arose
because, although alluvion formed on the banks of a river belongs to the
bank owner,102 alluvion formed on the shores of an arm of the sea belongs
to the State.103 Affirming the appellate court’s finding that Little Bay was
an arm of the sea, the court delineated several factors that help determine
whether a water body is an arm of the sea.104 If a water body is
“immediately adjacent” to the Gulf such that it forms a “bay along the Gulf
Coast,” then that water body is likely an arm of the sea.105 Similarly, if the
water body’s marshline is “washed by the tidal waters of the Gulf,” then
the water body is likely an arm of the sea.106 Applying these factors, the
court found that arms of the sea are those “bodies of water in the vicinity
of the open Gulf and which are directly overflowed by the waters of the
Gulf.”107
The existing jurisprudence clarifies that the State owns the bottoms of
an arm of the sea when it existed prior to state alienation,108 as is the case
with the bottoms of natural navigable water bodies. No law directly
addresses, however, whether the State owns land that became a sea bottom
after state alienation.
3. The Traditional Definition of “Seashore”
Similar to arms of the sea and natural navigable water bodies, if land
is seashore, then that land is a public thing that the State owns.109 Article
451 defines seashore as “the space of land over which the waters of the sea
spread in the highest tide during the winter season.”110 According to
Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos, this definition necessarily includes the

100. Alluvion is defined as “[a]n accumulation of soil, clay, or other material
deposited on the bank of a river.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 33–34 (9th ed.
2009).
101. Davis Oil Co., 576 So. 2d at 496.
102. LA. CIV. CODE art. 499.
103. Id. art. 500.
104. Davis Oil Co., 576 So. 2d at 501.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 500.
109. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450.
110. Id. art. 451.
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shores of arms of the sea and of the open gulf.111 Seashore, however, likely
does not include the shores of lands merely subject to regular tidal
overflow.112
The Louisiana Supreme Court carved out this limitation in Morgan v.
Negodich and Buras v. Salinovich.113 In Morgan, the parties disputed the
ownership of oyster beds.114 One party believed that the oyster beds grew
on a riverbank, while the other party believed that they grew on the
seashore.115 In finding that the oyster beds grew on the riverbank, the
Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the shores of a water body joining an
arm of the sea with an inland bay are not seashore.116 Similarly, the Buras
court found that marshlands ordinarily subject to overflow from gulf tides
are not seashore.117 In that case, the court reasoned that the redactors of the
Civil Code never intended for article 451 to include “any and all land that
is subject to tidal overflow, however remote from the ‘seashore,’ as it is
generally understood.”118 In both Morgan and Buras, the Louisiana
Supreme Court implied that the distance between the disputed land and the
sea, as well as the path of seawater that covers the land, are indicative of
whether land is seashore.119 Thus, land is likely seashore only if seawater
directly washes over it during “the highest tide [in] the winter season.”120
Under Morgan and Buras, as with natural navigable water bottoms
and sea bottoms, if submerged land was seashore prior to state alienation,
then that land falls within the scope of article 450 and is State owned. Even
so, though both Morgan and Buras implied that the State would own land
that transformed into seashore after state alienation, no law or case directly
addresses that proposition.

111. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 72, at 139.
112. See, e.g., Morgan v. Negodich, 3 So. 636 (La. 1887); Buras v. Salinovich,
97 So. 748 (La. 1923); see also Burns v. Crescent Gun & Rod Club, 41 So. 249
(La. 1906).
113. See Morgan, 3 So. at 636; Buras, 97 So. at 748.
114. 3 So. 636.
115. See id. at 637.
116. Id. at 638–40.
117. See 97 So. at 749–50.
118. Id. at 750.
119. Cf. id. (“These expressions in the Code ‘the sea and its shores,’ and
‘seashore,’ have reference to the gulf coast, and to the lakes, bays and sounds
along the coast.”); Morgan, 3 So. at 636.
120. LA. CIV. CODE art. 451 (2015).
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III. LOUISIANA OWNS ALL SUBMERGED LAND FITTING UNDER ARTICLE
450 REGARDLESS OF WHEN THAT LAND SUBMERGED
Under article 450, the State owns several different types of land,
including seashore,121 sea bottoms,122 and the beds and bottoms beneath
Louisiana’s navigable waters. But consider a tract of private marshland
that, in 1820, was located five miles inland from the Gulf of Mexico. As
the Gulf waters rose, or as the land subsided, that tract became submerged
under ten feet of water. Adhering to Louisiana’s public policy,
Constitution, Civil Code, and the jurisprudential reasoning of many
Louisiana courts, this tract of submerged marshland must fall within the
scope of article 450 and therefore be owned by the State. Although no
cases or doctrine direct a court’s analysis on this particular issue, seashore,
sea bottoms, and navigable water bottoms created after state alienation are
public things insusceptible of private ownership.123
A. The State Owns Submerged Land That Bordered Natural Navigable
Water Bodies
As private land abutting a natural navigable water body erodes into
that body, that land becomes part of the water body’s bottom, and,
consequently, its ownership is transferred to Louisiana under article
450.124 According to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Miami Corp., public
policy and sound logic necessitate this result.125 In that case, Miami
Corporation sought a declaration that it was the owner of an eroded area
forming a portion of Grand Lake’s bed.126 The court noted that “[i]t
121. See id. (defining seashore as land directly flooded by seawater during the
“highest tide during the winter season”).
122. Davis Oil Co. v. Citrus Land Co., 576 So. 2d 495, 501 (La. 1991)
(explaining that sea bottoms include land underneath “bodies of water in the
vicinity of the open Gulf and which are directly overflowed by the waters of the
Gulf”).
123. This Comment only seeks to address instances where the transformation
of land into an article 450 category is substantially due to natural forces.
124. See Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315, 323 (La. 1936) (“[W]hen
submersion occurs, the submerged portion becomes a part of the bed or bottom of
the navigable body of water in fact, and therefore the property of the State, by
virtue of its inherent sovereignty, as a matter of law.”); Buras v. Ellzey, 233 So.
2d 586 (La. Ct. App. 1970); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 69, at 132.
125. See Miami Corp., 173 So. at 316 (“It is the rule of property and of title in
this State, and also a rule of public policy that the State as a sovereignty, holds
title to the beds of navigable bodies of water.”); LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
126. See Miami Corp., 173 So. at 316.

908

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

appears to be the rule that where the forces of nature . . . have operated on
the banks of a navigable body of water . . . the submerged area becomes a
portion of the bed and is insusceptible of private ownership.”127 If the rule
in Miami Corp. was not the law, the entire rim of land surrounding a public
lake could erode and become private submerged land, thereby preventing
public use of the lake.128 Thus, taking policy considerations into account,
submerged land that formerly abutted a natural navigable water body must
be a public thing under article 450.
B. The State Owns the Bottoms of Natural Navigable Water Bodies
Created After State Alienation
Analyzing Louisiana’s jurisprudence that addresses the ownership of
the bottoms of natural navigable water bodies created after state alienation
proves to be quite difficult. No case directly presents the issue, and the
courts that tangentially address the issue only provide a framework that
might lead to improper interpretation.129 Fortunately, Louisiana’s public
policy, interpretative maxims, and the Louisiana Constitution—despite the
lack of guidance from Louisiana’s jurisprudence—lead to the conclusion
that all navigable water bottoms should be State owned, regardless of
when they became navigable.130
Capturing the essence of Louisiana’s public policy, Chief Justice
Fournet, in his dissent in California Co. v. Price, stated that a land grant
including navigable water bottoms was “equivalent to a patent to air, or to
127. Id. at 322.
128. Id. at 323.
129. See Vermilion Bay Land Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 646 So. 2d 408,
410–12 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that previous cases only dealt with water
bodies navigable in 1812, and subsequently, answering the question as to water
bodies that were non-navigable in 1812 but became navigable before severance).
130. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576, 590 (La. 1974)
(“It has been the public policy of the State of Louisiana at all times since its
admission into the Union that all navigable waters and the beds of same within its
boundaries are common or public things and insusceptible of private ownership . . . .”
(quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1107 (1954))); but see Delacroix Corp. v. JonesO’Brien, Inc., 597 So. 2d 65, 69–70 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (implying that the public
policy discussed in Gulf Oil does not apply to inland navigable lakes). A
landowner’s right of reclamation—the right to apply for a permit that allows a
landowner to reclaim land that he has lost due to erosion by essentially rebuilding
the land—is the only exception to the prohibition on private ownership of
Louisiana’s natural navigable water bottoms. See LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
Louisiana’s submerged coastal environment remains privately owned, or at the very
least, privately claimed.
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the water running through the Mississippi river on its way to the sea.”131
Chief Justice Fournet further explained that “[a]n arm of the sea is one of
those things which all men may freely use conformable with the use for
which it is intended by nature, and is among those things that are
insusceptible of private ownership.”132 Courts consistently interpret this
public policy to mean that Louisiana does not permit private control over
the bottoms of channels of commerce; thus, those courts consistently find
that navigable water bottoms existing in 1812 or created prior to state
alienation are insusceptible of private ownership.133 Those courts did not
address the ownership of water bodies that become navigable in fact after
state alienation, however. “[P]rivately owned land does not become part
of a navigable body of water” and thus does not become insusceptible of
private ownership “when a nearby navigable body of water overflows its
normal bed and temporarily covers the property.”134 But several sound
reasons exist, in addition to strong public policy, for why land should be
insusceptible of private ownership when that land indefinitely becomes the
bottom of a navigable water body.
A literal interpretation of article 450 dictates that these lands become
public by operation of law.135 Article 450 does not distinguish between the
bottoms of water bodies that became navigable in fact before severance
from state ownership and water bodies that become navigable in fact after
state alienation. The article simply states that the bottoms of natural
navigable water bodies are public things.136 Obeying the maxim “where
the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish,” the ownership
131. Cal. Co. v. Price, 74 So. 2d 1, 16 (La. 1953) (Fournet, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (internal citations omitted).
133. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp., 317 So. 2d at 582 (“[N]avigable water bottoms
other than rivers are public things insusceptible of private ownership.”); State v.
Barras, 615 So. 2d 285, 287 (La. 1993) (“The beds of navigable waters are
insusceptible of private ownership.”); Miami Corp., 173 So. at 326 (“But, in order
to reach this conclusion, the court had to go counter to the long-established sound
principles of public policy in our jurisprudence—that the title to the bottoms of
navigable bodies of water belong to the State as a result of its inherent sovereignty
and are insusceptible of private ownership.”); see also Vermilion Bay Land Co.,
646 So. 2d at 410–12 (noting that previous cases only dealt with water bodies
navigable in 1812 and, subsequently, answering the question as to water bodies
that were non-navigable in 1812 but became navigable before severance).
134. Walker Lands, Inc. v. E. Carroll Parish Police Jury, 871 So. 2d 1258,
1264 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis added).
135. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 63, at 116 (noting that a literal
interpretation of article 450 may lead to this conclusion); cf. LA. CIV. CODE art.
450 (2015).
136. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450.
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of the bottoms of newly navigable water bodies should revert to the
State.137
The Louisiana Constitution also supports this conclusion. Article IX,
section 3 provides that “[t]he legislature shall neither alienate nor
authorize the alienation of the bed of a navigable water body, except for
purposes of reclamation by the riparian owner to recover land lost through
erosion.”138 In ratifying this provision, Louisiana’s voters expressed their
desire to keep these water bottoms out of private ownership.139 Thus, “if a
non-navigable stream” or other body of water “becomes navigable, it
would cease to be susceptible of private ownership and would become
property of the state.”140 Further, nothing in the Louisiana Constitution,
the Civil Code, or the jurisprudence suggests that a privately owned thing
cannot become a public thing by operation of law. As such, as private land
submerges beneath seawater or naturally navigable waterways, that
private land becomes public by operation of law.141
Lastly, if the bottoms of water bodies that become naturally navigable
after state alienation were susceptible of private ownership, then the
bottoms of a body of water large enough to support substantial commercial
137. A similar result would be reached in most other states. See, e.g., Tenney
v. Dep’t of Health & Evntl. Control, 712 S.E.2d 395, 399–400 (S.C. 2011) (noting
that when marshland erodes or becomes submerged because of changing tides,
ownership reverts back to the state); City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d
542, 550 (N.J. 2010) (“Under the common law, the owner of oceanfront property
. . . loses to the State title over land that becomes tidally flowed as a result of
erosion.”); see also TH Invs., Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, L.P., 218 S.W.3d 173,
184–85 (Tex. App. 2007) (explaining that the boundary of public and private
ownership along water bodies is not static, and that as land becomes submerged,
ownership reverts back to the State).
138. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
139. See Hargrave, supra note 75, at 660–61.
140. Id. at 661.
141. See Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315, 322 (La. 1936) (“It appears to be
the rule that where the forces of nature—subsidence and erosion—have operated
on the banks of a navigable body of water, regardless of whether it be a body of
fresh water or the sea, or an arm of the sea, the submerged area becomes a portion
of the bed and is insusceptible of private ownership.”); Clinton W. Shinn, Of
Coase, the Takings Clause, and the Inexorably Shrinking Marsh: A Review with
Lagniappe, 29 S.U. L. REV. 271, 284–85 (2002) (“Without the vegetation, the soil
crumbles away beneath the encroaching saltwater, first in pools, then ponds, then
lakes and bays, all technically navigable and, thus, state owned. By operation of
law, private marsh becomes public navigable water bottoms.”). Courts would
likely not consider this change in ownership to be an expropriation of private
property. See infra Part III.C.
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activity could be private. If such a water body could be private, the owner
could possibly interfere with trade.142 That result is impermissible because,
under Article 450,143 the public domain indefinitely retains the right to use
Article 450 waters and bottoms without private interference.144
Considering Louisiana’s strong public policy opposing the alienation of
navigable water bottoms from the State,145 the effects of a law that allows
the private ownership of navigable water bottoms leads to absurd results
that Louisiana’s legal regime should not tolerate. Therefore, as a principle
of law and public policy, Louisiana must own land that becomes the
bottom of a natural navigable water body after state alienation.
C. The State Owns Sea Bottoms and Seashores Created After State
Alienation
As with the bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, sea bottom and
seashore created before state alienation is clearly insusceptible of private
ownership.146 But whether land that transformed into sea bottom and
seashore after state alienation is susceptible of private ownership remains
undecided. Several courts have implied that the bottoms and shores of

142. Although private ownership of this land would present problems for
individuals attempting to engage in trade in these water bodies, the federal
navigational servitude, derived from the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution, would likely substantially curtail the ability of the private landowner
to interfere with trade in this instance. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also
Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(noting the navigational servitude gives the federal government “a dominant
servitude” that allows it “to regulate and control the waters of the United States
in the interest of commerce”).
143. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2015) (declaring that the waters and bottoms
of natural navigable water bodies are always state-owned).
144. See id. art. 450 cmt. b (noting that the nature of public things is that they
are dedicated to public use and held in the public trust for such use).
145. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576, 586 (La. 1974).
146. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:3 (2012); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47,
§ 72, at 139.
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arms of the sea and the Gulf of Mexico are always State owned;147
however, some older jurisprudence suggests otherwise.148
Citing this older jurisprudence, Professor Yiannopoulos suggests that
private individuals may own portions of sea bottom.149 Still, Louisiana law
only permits sea bottom ownership in extremely rare cases where the State
issued patents to the sea bottom prior to 1921.150 Those patents’ validity is
a consequence of a line of controversial jurisprudence,151 which further
casts doubt on the legitimacy of private ownership of sea bottom and
seashore. As to sea bottoms created since 1921, however, Louisiana law is
unequivocal: “[W]hen the water bottom in question lies . . . under the sea
or an arm of the sea, it is explicitly included among the inalienable things
vested in the State.”152 Thus, submerged land that becomes sea bottom or
seashore after state alienation is a public thing that the State owns.
147. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp., 317 So. 2d at 582–83 (“Moreover, when the
water bottom in question lies, as in this case, under the sea or an arm of the sea, it
is explicitly included among the inalienable things vested in the State.”); Fradella
Const., Inc. v. Roth, 503 So. 2d 25, 27 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (“Lands that have
become sea bottoms as well as accretions formed at a seashore belong to the
State.”).
148. See, e.g., Cal. Co. v. Price, 74 So. 2d 1 (La. 1953).
149. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 69, at 132.
150. Id.
151. In California Co. v. Price, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in the face of
three vigorous dissents, declared that patents to navigable water bottoms and sea
bottoms were valid. 74 So. 2d at 13–14. For the next 20 years, courts criticized
that opinion and often attempted to circumvent the holding. Finally, in 1974, the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp., 317 So. 2d 576, overruled California
Co. and all cases applying the same reasoning, noting those cases were based upon
“erroneous reasoning.” But see Delacroix Corp. v. Jones-O’Brien, Inc., 597 So.
2d 65, 69–70 (La. Ct. App. 1992). In Delacroix Corp., the Fourth Circuit held that
the reasoning in Gulf Oil Corp. did not apply to an interior lake. Id. By doing so,
the court may have given new life to California Co. and its progeny.
152. Gulf Oil Corp., 317 So. 2d at 582–83; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:3 (2012)
(“The State of Louisiana owns in full and complete ownership the waters of the
Gulf of Mexico and of the arms of the Gulf and the beds and shores of the Gulf
and the arms of the Gulf, including all lands that are covered by the waters of the
Gulf and its arms either at low tide or high tide, within the boundaries of
Louisiana.”); see also La. Navigation Co. v. Oyster Comm’n of La., 51 So. 706,
711 (La. 1910) (“Hence, there can be no such thing in this state as private
ownership of the bed of a navigable river, and a fortiori can there be no such thing
as private ownership of the bed of the sea or of an arm of the sea.”); cf. Cal. Co.,
74 So. 2d at 17–29 (Hawthorne, J., dissenting) (citing to nine different legislative
acts clearly evincing a public policy opposed to private ownership of sea bottoms:
Act No. 106 of 1886, Act No. 110 of 1892, Act No. 121 of 1896, Act No. 153 of
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The Louisiana Constitution of 1974,153 the Louisiana Civil Code,154
and the Louisiana Revised Statutes155 dictate that natural navigable water
bottoms, sea bottoms, and seashore are insusceptible of private ownership.
None of these sources indicate that exceptions exist or that this rule should
not apply to lands that, after state alienation, submerge due to natural
forces. Rather, jurisprudence and legal scholarship suggest that classifying
newly navigable water bottoms, newly created sea bottoms, and newly
created seashore as public things under article 450 is reasonable.156
Further, reading article 450 in light of the majority view of Louisiana’s
public policy157 leads to the conclusion that those newly submerged lands
fall within the scope of article 450. Thus, all submerged land exhibiting
the characteristics of the water bodies explicitly included under article 450,
regardless of when they began to exhibit those characteristics, are public
things that the State owns.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR STATE ACTION
As Louisiana law currently stands, no provision directly addresses
whether ownership changes when coastal land submerges due to erosion,
subsidence, sea-level rise, and other similar forces. Even so, the legislature
could fill the gap by drafting a new revised statute that incorporates the
spirit of code articles, constitutional provisions, and current statutes.
1902, Act No. 52 of 1904, Act No. 189 of 1910, Act No. 54 of 1914, Act No. 139
of 1924, and Act No. 67 of 1932).
153. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (“The legislature shall neither alienate nor
authorize the alienation of the bed of a navigable water body, except for purposes
of reclamation by the riparian owner to recover land lost through erosion.”).
154. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2015) (“Public things that belong to the state are
such as running waters, the waters and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies,
the territorial sea, and the seashore.”); see also id. art. 450 cmt. c (“The first
category consists of things which according to constitutional and legislative
provisions are inalienable and necessarily owned by the state or its political
subdivisions.”).
155. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:3 (2012).
156. See Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315, 322 (La. 1936); Vermilion Bay
Land Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 646 So. 2d 408, 411–12 (La. Ct. App. 1994);
Hargrave, supra note 75, at 660–61; YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 63, at 116
(noting that a literal interpretation of article 450 may lead to this conclusion).
157. See, e.g., Miami Corp., 173 So. at 326 (“But, in order to reach this
conclusion, the court had to go counter to the long-established sound principles
of public policy in our jurisprudence—that the title to the bottoms of navigable
bodies of water belong to the State as a result of its inherent sovereignty and are
insusceptible of private ownership.”); Gulf Oil Corp., 317 So. 2d at 590.
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A. The Inadequacy of Non-Legislative Solutions
According to the massive amount of scientific data, Louisiana’s coastal
lands are perpetually submerging, shifting, and rising, particularly in the
changing delta lobes of the Mississippi River.158 This pervasive
environmental and societal change necessitates legal adaptation, because
that change blurs the traditional line between private and public property.
The legislature must address the ownership of submerged lands and can do
so in a variety of ways.
The legislature could instruct the State Lands Office to conduct a more
comprehensive review of Louisiana’s coastal lands. A detailed survey may
reveal the submerged lands that the State believes it owns, thus giving the
public an idea of what lands it can utilize. An extensive survey, however,
would be costly,159 would likely invite litigation from landowners who feel
that the State is informally encroaching on their land,160 and would not
provide finality with respect to land title statewide.161
Conversely, the State, seeking a declaration of its ownership of certain
submerged tracts of land, could file suit against private landowners. This
action would be conclusive of land title, and, if the State won, would result
in more public land.162 Still, this process would be expensive and
cumbersome. Perhaps more importantly, a court could find that even as new
land submerges well beneath water, title remains with the private
landowner.
Although both of these possible solutions have some benefits, neither
solution attacks the heart of the problem: no clear pronouncement of
Louisiana law exists regarding newly submerged land. The only option to
solve this problem is to draft a piece of legislation directly addressing the
ownership of submerged land; however, in doing so, the legislature must
diligently draft the legislation to avoid potential obstructions.

158. See Anderson, supra note 2; see also Frazier, supra note 16; McLindon,
supra note 16.
159. Telephone Interview with Ryan Seidemann, supra note 5.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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B. Putting to Rest the State’s Potential Concerns Regarding Legislation
Asserting Ownership over Certain Submerged Lands
The oil and gas industry owns much of the coastal land in Louisiana and
contributes significantly to the Louisiana economy.163 As a result, that
industry’s presence influences the State’s decisions. If the Louisiana
Legislature passed a statute claiming ownership over a vast majority of
submerged land in coastal Louisiana, the statute may disrupt thousands of
titles to land where the oil and gas industry is heavily invested.164 Louisiana
may not have the funding or resources to litigate thousands of title claims.
Additionally, the State may be hesitant to enact legislation declaring
ownership over formerly private lands because doing so may give rise to
takings issues under the Federal and Louisiana Constitutions.165 Inevitably,
private landowners would claim that the State could not take their land
without giving just compensation. Although these two concerns are
significant, neither should keep the State from declaring ownership over all
submerged lands constituting sea bottom, seashore, and navigable water
bottom.
1. The Takings Clause Would Not Apply to the Reversion of
Ownership of Natural Navigable Water Bottoms, Sea Bottoms, or
Seashore
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, sections 2
and 4, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 prohibit the expropriation of
private property without just compensation.166 A reversion of ownership due
to natural submersion may violate this core principle.167
163. See Newest Economic Impact Study Reinforces Oil and Gas Industry’s
Importance to Louisiana, supra note 35.
164. Cf. Delacroix Corp. v. Jones-O’Brien, Inc., 597 So. 2d 65, 70 (La. Ct.
App. 1992) (noting that Phillips Petroleum Co. & Cinque Bambini P’ship v.
Mississippi & Saga Petroleum U.S., Inc. “sets the stage for disruption of land titles
across all Louisiana wetlands”).
165. See Hargrave, supra note 75, at 661.
166. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 7; LA. CONST. art. I, § 2, § 4.
167. An open question exists regarding precisely what action or inaction by
the State would constitute man-caused submersion and what would constitute
natural submersion. Some believe that the State may be inclined to neglect coastal
erosion and subsidence problems, which would inevitably lead to the submersion
of portions of Louisiana’s coast and more state-owned land. Additionally, some
scholars believe that extensive dredging and other types of disruption by oil and
gas companies in prior decades have greatly contributed to Louisiana’s current
rate of land loss. This Comment does not endeavor to decide where to draw the
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According to Professor Yiannopoulos, a “[s]trong argument may be
made that the acquisition by the state of the ownership of the beds of
formerly non-navigable water bodies is a taking of property without
compensation.”168 After all, the idea that a person can buy waterfront
property from the State and then have to give that land back, free of charge,
once the property submerges seems unfair. Still, to prevail on a takings
clause claim, a party must prove that governmental action proximately and
directly caused the damage or taking.169 When land naturally submerges so
significantly that the submersion falls under article 450, government action
does not cause the land to revert to State ownership.170 Rather, the change
in ownership occurs by operation of law.171 Yet Louisiana creates the law.
One may reasonably conclude that Louisiana’s adoption of a statute
dictating that the State owns formerly private land would cause
unconstitutional takings unless the State justly compensated private
landowners. This argument, however, would call into question several
Louisiana Civil Code provisions that dictate that ownership of a thing
changes when natural forces change the categorical nature of that thing.172
For example, when natural forces overtake, destroy, or damage a public road
bordering a river, thereby changing the nature of that road into a river
bottom, Louisiana Civil Code article 666 requires the owner of the land
underneath the road to furnish more land, without compensation, so that the
State can construct a new road.173
line between man-caused submersion and natural submersion to such a particular
extent. Rather, the purpose of this Comment is to offer a possible solution to one
problem and to lay a foundation for more extensive debate concerning the many
land-loss-related problems confronting Louisiana.
168. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 47, § 63, at 116.
169. See Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149–50 (1924); see also
Mongrue v. Monsanto Co., 249 F.3d 422, 429–30 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that
a governmental body or “state actor” has to be involved in the taking for a party
to be subject to a takings claim).
170. See Hargrave, supra note 75, at 661 (“[I]f a nonnavigable stream becomes
navigable, it would cease to be susceptible of private ownership and would
become property of the state. The argument that such a change in ownership may
be a taking without due process (absent compensation) probably falls because
such a loss is not caused by the state itself.” (footnote omitted)).
171. See Gaudet v. City of Kenner, 487 So. 2d 446, 448 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
(explaining that, with respect to water bottoms, the state is vested with something
that looks like “instantaneous prescription” and that ownership reverts by
“operation of law”); see also River Lands Fleeting Corp. v. Ashland Plantation,
Inc., 498 So. 2d 38, 41 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
172. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 655, 666, 751 (2015).
173. See id. art. 666.
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Moreover, the Louisiana Constitution impliedly supports the idea that
no taking occurs when natural forces overtake privately owned land.174 The
constitution suggests that navigable water bottoms are always State owned,
thereby implying that no taking need to occur for the State to become owner
of land that has eroded or subsided into a navigable water bottom.175 This
logic applies a pari to sea bottoms and seashore. Further, such a notion is
not exclusive to Louisiana176 and is consistent with the sovereign nature of
navigable water bottoms, sea bottoms, and seashore. Thus, when ownership
changes because natural forces move property boundaries, the change
occurs automatically and does not create a taking of private property.
2. Concerns of Litigation Expenses are Unwarranted
Louisiana, although the rightful owner, may be inclined to avoid
declaring ownership of submerged lands because state officials do not want
to fund the resulting mass of litigation. Most of Louisiana’s coastal
marshlands are privately owned,177 and the landowners would be quick to
sue if the State threatened to absorb their valuable lands. The “freeze
statute,”178 which leaves preexisting mineral rights on submerged lands
unaffected when title to that property reverts to the State, would likely deter
some litigation, however.179 Additionally, a piece of legislation declaring
State ownership would be presumptively valid,180 meaning that parties
challenging the statute would face an uphill battle, thereby deterring more
litigation. Though these considerations may limit the oncoming litigation,
the prospect of future mineral interests would prompt most prominent,
affluent private landowners to sue. Even so, the State could address the
remaining litigation by asking a court to join all plaintiffs sharing a common
interest into one suit or by passing a special venue statute to limit the
174. See LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
175. See id. This provision does allow for a private landowner to reclaim
navigable water bottoms lost through erosion; however, having the right of
reclamation necessarily presumes that the ownership of the eroded land changed
in the first instance due to the erosion.
176. See supra note 137.
177. See Anderson, supra note 2.
178. Though the “freeze statute” is still in force, its existence is constitutionally
questionable because the statute may violate the public trust doctrine. A discussion
of this statute’s constitutionality is outside the scope of this Comment, however.
179. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1151 (2006).
180. City of New Orleans v. Toca, 75 So. 238, 239 (La. 1917) (“A statute or
ordinance is not to be supposed to have been adopted without due deliberation . . . .
This gives rise to a presumption of validity in favor of the legislative action . . . .”).
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locations where suits against the State could be brought, in hopes of
consolidating the litigation.181 Thus, despite an expected spike in litigation
and the possibility of takings claims, neither practical nor constitutional
concerns should be sufficient to prevent the legislature from enacting this
long-overdue legislation.
C. A Revised Statute to Address the Ownership of Submerged Land
The legislation that this Comment proposes includes the benefits that
the two lesser solutions offer and also unites certain provisions of
Louisiana’s law with Louisiana’s public policy, which dictates that the State
must own certain submerged lands.182 Article IX, section 3 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 provides that the State may not alienate a navigable
water bottom unless that land became bottom via erosion, and the previous
landowners want to rebuild the land.183 Thus, this constitutional provision
implies that when land becomes a navigable water bottom via erosion, the
State owns that land.184 Similarly, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:3
states that the State owns all seawater and sea bottom of the Gulf of Mexico
and its arms within Louisiana’s territorial boundary.185 Though this statute
does not directly address sea bottoms and seashores that natural forces
created after state alienation, its spirit dictates that no sea bottom or seashore
is susceptible to private ownership.
The proposed statute, meshing the clear language found in those
constitutional and statutory provisions with new language reflecting
Louisiana’s public policy, reads as follows:
When, due to natural forces including but not limited to erosion,
subsidence, and sea-level rise, land becomes so submerged that it
forms the bottom or bed of a navigable water body, or the bottoms
or shores of the sea, including the bottoms and shores of arms of the
sea, then that land becomes a public thing insusceptible of private
181. For an example of a venue statute specially drafted to deal with claims
against the State, see Louisiana Revised Statutes section 13:5104(A) (Supp. 2005)
(providing that all lawsuits brought against the State or a state agency “shall be
instituted before the district court of the judicial district in which the state capitol
is located or in the district court having jurisdiction in the parish in which the
cause of action arises”).
182. See supra note 130.
183. The logic applying to eroded land that becomes navigable water bottom
would apply a pari to land that becomes navigable water bottom via other natural
processes like subsidence and sea-level rise.
184. See LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
185. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:3 (2012).
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ownership. This provision applies regardless of whether land
became submerged after State alienation.186
By following the spirit and the letter of Louisiana’s existing law, this
new statute puts an end to much of the uncertainty regarding submerged
land ownership and provides courts with a definite rule to address a problem
that will arise with increasing frequency in the coming years.
CONCLUSION
Alluding to legal systems’ propensity to rely on outdated principles of law,
Justice McLean of the United States Supreme Court noted, “[a]ntiquity has its
charms . . . but it may be doubted whether wisdom is not more frequently found
in experience and the gradual progress of human affairs . . . .”187 Though he
delivered this message as a warning regarding outdated admiralty laws,188 his
words aptly fit the situation currently confronting Louisiana’s coastal property
law. Either the legislature can do nothing and allow the complete confusion
regarding the ownership and use of submerged lands to continue, or the
legislature can revise the law governing the ownership of submerged lands to
reflect the dynamic nature of Louisiana’s coastal environment. Because coastal
lands are rapidly sinking, the legislature must adopt a statute capable of
dealing with land submersion. This Comment proposes adopting a statute
that will bring the law in the right direction.189 This statute will provide
clarity regarding submerged-land ownership and use while placing these
lands in the hands of their rightful owner, the people of Louisiana. The
legislature is aware of the issues that our current, static law creates with
respect to Louisiana’s ever-changing coastal environment. Before millions

186. This statute should not be interpreted to abdicate, in any way, Louisiana’s
affirmative duty to conserve and preserve its natural resources under the Public
Trust Doctrine.
187. Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 307 (1857)
(McLean, J., concurring).
188. See id. (warning that the United States’ admiralty laws improperly relied
on old, misconstrued statutes instead of relying more heavily on progressive civil
law rules).
189. The proposed statute will not mend this entire area of law. Even so, this
Comment will hopefully prompt scholarly discussion and debate regarding
significant issues that are confronting Louisiana.
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more acres of Louisiana’s coastal land give way to Mother Nature’s will,
the legislature must mend Louisiana’s outdated land classification regime.
Jacques Mestayer 
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